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GENDER INEQUALITIES AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
AGGRESSION: THE ROLE OF FEMINISM IN ACHIEVING 
PEACE 
Katie Heaney 
 
Abstract  International relations scholars have often looked to domestic state composition and 
structure to examine root causes of interstate behavior, specifically disputes.  This research 
study adds to this growing body of literature by using a feminist perspective to analyze the 
relationship between state-level gender equality and international military disputes.  I 
hypothesize that those nations with lower fertility rates and higher representations of women in 
parliament, both variables taken together to represent gender equality, will engage in fewer and 
less hostile military disputes.  The findings of this study confirm my expectations; nations that 
ascribe to egalitarian ideals and practices typically extend this framework to their international 
relations as well.  It is therefore suggested that future studies in peace consider the positive 
effects gender equality has upon domestic and international relations.   
 
Introduction 
 
 Scholars of international relations, a largely male-dominated discipline, have typically looked 
to traditional power structures and coalition composition to explain interstate behaviors and 
conflicts (Regan & Paskeviciute 2003).  However, in recent years, feminist literature has criticized 
this male-defined viewpoint for focusing entirely on regime characteristics without investigating 
possible societal explanations (Regan & Paskeviciute 2003).  These feminist scholars argue that the 
male domination of international relations studies relies on a masculine conception of power 
relationships and structures without considering the unique role women play (Regan & Paskeviciute 
2003).  It is then crucial to consider an alternative, feminist viewpoint in order to more accurately 
understand international power relations.  The foundation of this feminist stance is based on the 
argument that domestic political actions and values will be reflected in a state’s international actions; 
in other words, those states that breed conflict at home through structural inequalities will be more 
likely to seek conflict abroad (Caprioli 2003).  Mary Caprioli (2000, 2001, 2003) largely pioneered the 
expansion of this broader argument to focus on the causal relationship between gender inequality 
and interstate conflict.  The present study seeks to further develop her work by updating the 
quantitative analysis of military conflicts, expanding the theoretical basis for understanding women 
as peacemakers, and studying how the military aggressions of those nations with higher levels of 
gender equality differ from those with greater inequalities.   
Many of the world’s women have seen greatly increased social, political, and economic 
equality in recent decades, though no state today can boast a truly gender-equal society.  This study 
will argue that those states with higher gender equality will be more pacific in nature, with less 
frequent military aggressions.  Research on this topic provides several theoretical explanations for 
this relationship.  Some feminist scholars argue that the systematic subordination of women by 
states relies on the belief that women are inferior, and that these patterns of discrimination, hostility, 
and subordination carry over into interstate interactions (Caprioli 2000).  Others point to the 
gendered differences in viewpoints on war and peace.  Before ultimately outlining the importance of 
feminism in achieving international peace, the next section details both theoretical frameworks in 
order to better explain the basis for my hypothesis. 
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Domestic vs. International State Behavior 
 
The first theoretical framework for the argument that gender inequality causes interstate 
military aggression is founded in the extension of domestic structural hierarchies to international 
behaviors.  These feminist scholars argue that a structural system that breeds norms of violence and 
oppression will extend these behaviors to the international level because a culture of superiority and 
subordination will be reflected in the decision-making processes of those states’ leaders (Caprioli 
2003).  Those states that are committed to structural equality will support freedom and diplomacy 
while also rejecting hierarchical subordination and the use of force or aggression (Caprioli 2003).  As 
such, the more a society values structural equality, the more likely it will reject military aggression as 
a viable solution to interstate disputes.  Gender inequality remains one of the most prevalent forms 
of structural inequality worldwide; therefore, it follows that this broader theory is, at least in part, 
behind the causal relationship between gender inequality and military aggression.   
 
The Gender Gap in Opinions on War 
 
 The second theoretical framework behind my research question involves the so-called 
“gender gap” between men’s and women’s views on the use of military force.  This framework is 
divided into two main groups: the “essentialists” vs. the “constructivists;” in other words, nature vs. 
nurture, respectively (Melander 2005).  A third group, called the “consequentialist” perspective, 
focuses more on the role that women’s interests play in their differing views on military aggression.  
In the next section, I will describe each theory in detail and explain how each provides support for 
my hypothesis. 
 
Essentialism 
 
Proponents of the essentialist argument, at the most extreme end of the theoretical 
continuum, contend that women’s natural reproductive role leads them to an inherent and 
compassionate aversion to violence, extending their role as caregiver from the personal to the 
international level (Melander 2005).  This belief is based on the fundamentally unalterable 
differences between men and women, such as higher levels of testosterone in males and the birthing 
capabilities of women (Nincic & Nincic 2002).  Carol Gilligan (1982) found that women consistently 
demonstrated the tendency to care for others and to prefer “harmonious human relations” to 
personal achievements and conquests, while men were more likely to value competition and rivalry.  
Essentialists argue that women’s biological maternal instincts lead them to reject a distinction 
between individual and collective forms of violence, viewing both as equally objectionable (Melander 
2005).  Because essentialists believe the gender gap stems from biological differences, they do not 
believe that the gap can be closed; in other words, men will not become more peaceful, nor women 
more aggressive (Nincic & Nincic 2002).  The essentialist argument leads us to infer that when 
women are more equal in a society, and therefore able to influence political action, states will be less 
likely to initiate aggressive military force, which contradicts women’s natural caretaking disposition 
(Melander 2005).   
 
Constructivism 
 
 Some feminist scholars challenge the essentialist point of view, insisting that it only serves to 
reinforce traditional feminine stereotypes that support their continued subordination by men, and 
34                                  Res Publica  
 
 
that there are no “essential components” that define all women (Melander 2005).  These scholars 
often instead support the constructivist point of view, which argues that female aversion to violence 
is not biologically inherent but rather associated with socially constructed definitions of femininity 
(Melander 2005).  From this viewpoint, men are “assigned” to the masculine role of potential 
warrior, valuing honor and one’s manhood, while women are assigned the roles of the male’s 
audience in front of which men must perform their strength (Melander 2005).  Feminist 
constructivists argue that when men and women are forced to conform to these traditional gender 
roles, men will seek violent action and the establishment of domination (Melander 2005).  
Constructivists believe that evolving cultural norms and stereotypes could modify the current ‘social 
construction’ of gender and therefore close the gender gap; however, gender roles today are deeply 
entrenched in society (Nincic & Nincic 2002).  If it is true that men are more aggressive than women 
because of their learned tendency to behave like “warriors,” then as long as men continue to 
dominate political power and society, state policies will reflect those macho-militant norms (Caprioli 
2003).  If this is indeed the case, I would then expect to find that those cultures that enforce strict 
gender roles upon their citizens will more often seek aggressive action in the international arena.  
Furthermore, those states that reject these traditional roles will replicate that pattern of equality and 
diplomacy in their relations with other states.   
 
Consequentialism 
 
 Instead of addressing inherent or constructed explanations for women’s differing views on 
war, the third perspective, consequentialist, identifies women’s interests as the basis for the gender 
gap in military aggression opinions.  From this perspective, women’s propensity to oppose military 
action stems from the fact that they are increasingly the major victims of war (Nincic & Nincic 
2002).  Though they may not participate proportionally in the frontlines of battle, women suffer 
disproportionately as civilian targets and from the contextual results of modern war – sexual 
violation, widowhood, poverty, loss of sons and husbands, the responsibility to care for victims, etc. 
(Nincic & Nincic 2002).  Feminist scholars argue that war is “particularly devastating to women in 
ways that matter most to them…apart from the issue of sexual violence, there is the fact that the 
majority of those displaced by war are women and children” (Nincic & Nincic 2002).  Therefore, in 
weighing the costs and benefits of possible military action, women are likely to consider the variety 
of risks at hand for themselves and ultimately oppose aggressive action.   
 
Feminism’s Role in the Pursuit of Peace 
 
 Having investigated several theoretical frameworks for understanding military aggression, it 
is important to understand how feminism (and the resulting societal gender equality that stems from 
the acceptance of its tenets) plays a role in establishing peaceful societies.  Feminism is the belief 
that women and men are equal, have the right to equal opportunity, and have the right to be free 
from discrimination on the basis of sex.  Those nations that ascribe to the beliefs of feminism 
(whether labeling it as such or not) reflect a commitment to its values: democracy, freedom, equality, 
and self-government (Conover & Sapiro 1993).  Furthermore, it is not just the commitment to 
democratic values that connects feminism and feminist societies to an antimilitaristic worldview, but 
the actual application of those values in society.  Feminist theory of democracy involves a rejection 
of “hierarchy, domination, and the use of force or exploitation; moreover, it specifically identifies 
the military as bastion of sexism” (Brock-Utne 1985).  Societies characterized by overt sexism and 
structural violence against women tend to exhibit these same aggressive, subordinating traits in their 
Res Publica                                                                           35                
 
 
 
 
 
interactions in the international arena.  To eliminate aggression internationally, societies must also 
eliminate aggression internally.  In order for societies to achieve peace, leaders must possess 
“openness, cooperativeness, and nurturance;” traits almost exclusively fostered in women who are 
excluded from arenas of male-dominated political decision-making (Sterba 1994).  Therefore, 
feminist societies inclusive of women with pacific traits (whether instilled by nurture or by nature) 
will ultimately be more likely to reject military aggression, owing to the theoretical opposition to 
hierarchy and domination.   
This research project does not seek to identify either the essentialist or constructivist 
theoretical argument as the “correct” explanation of women’s tendencies toward pacifism; that 
question involves a “nature vs. nurture” debate that is far beyond the scope of this analysis.   Nor 
does this project seek to affirm the consequentialist feminist claim that women suffer 
disproportionately in times of war.  Of greater importance to this research is the fact that each 
theoretical framework discussed previously leads to the same expectations about international state 
aggression (Caprioli 2004).  In every case, the inequalities fostered between men and women at 
home are causally linked to greater military aggressions abroad.  Whether by nature or nurture, 
women consistently oppose military action with greater frequency then men, as polling data from 
the Gulf War and the War in Iraq indicate (Gallagher 1993; Morin & Deane 2002).  As such, I 
expect that in states where women have reached greater equality, their opinions and/or ability to 
influence executive decisions should reflect a greater hesitancy to initiate military aggression.  In the 
next section, I will explain how this relationship will be measured by identifying the variables to be 
considered. 
 
Research Design 
 
 Previous studies in this area have often focused on the effect of gender equality on interstate 
military disputes, without discriminating between the initiating and the invaded states (Caprioli 2000; 
Caprioli & Boyer 2001; Regan & Paskeviciute 2003).  I believe that it is more faithful to the 
argument at hand to define the dependent variable as “military aggression.”  In a more recent study 
(2003), Mary Caprioli conducted a similar project, defining her dependent variable as “state 
aggression” measured by the first state to use force in an interstate dispute.  Caprioli used military 
dispute data from 1978-1992, and in my research I intend to update her analysis by using the 
International Military Intervention data set that includes data between 1989 and 2005.  Caprioli’s 
databases relied on the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, combined with an original dataset to 
include a measure of the first state use of force, which was coded by Caprioli as a dichotomous 
variable, coded “1” if the state was the first to use force and “0” otherwise (2003).  However, 
Caprioli’s personal database is inaccessible at this time, and I believe the IMI database holds certain 
advantages to be explained in the following section.  Still, the IMI database includes “intervener” 
country codes that can be utilized in a similar manner to the MID set.   
 
Measuring Dependent Variables – Military Aggression and Type of Conflict Pursued 
 
Past studies, such as Caprioli’s, focus mainly on the relationship between gender equality and 
interstate military aggression without examining the variation in types of dispute initiated; for 
example, humanitarian or social protectionist intervention versus intimidation or pursuit of rebel 
forces.  Can greater gender equality not only reduce military disputes initiated, but also minimize the 
hostility level of those disputes?  If the theoretical frameworks for this causal relationship hold true, 
I expect to find that those nations with greater gender equality will not only engage in military 
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aggression less frequently, but will also engage in a different, less hostile brand of military 
interaction. 
While the MID database includes some measures of hostility (levels 1-5), it lacks in 
description of the type of conflict pursued by the aggressor.   This information, provided by the IMI 
database, is crucial to understanding the relationship between gender equality and military 
aggression.  I will include a measure of the type of troop activity initiated (i.e. humanitarian vs. 
territorial) and the numbers of both troops and casualties incurred, as an operational definition of 
aggression and violence.  Military disputes can be coded with a dummy variable for “less aggressive” 
interventions: humanitarian or protectionist (1 for yes, 0 for no), as well as for each type of “more 
aggressive” intervention (defined as any of the following IMI variables:  pursuit of rebel forces, 
strategic intervention, or territorial intervention), again coded 1 for  “yes” and 0 for “no”.  This data 
will allow for a unique opportunity to examine the level of hostility and military aggression initiated 
by gender-equal versus gender-unequal states.  If women are indeed more pacific, we would expect 
that their equal inclusion and opportunity in society will cause those states to initiate military conflict 
both less frequently and in a less hostile manner – for example, for humanitarian efforts as opposed 
to the intent to gain territory.    
These measures are subjective, having been identified by type by the creators of the IMI 
database.  As such, it is important that this study also consider objective measures of military 
violence.  Casualties are one such measure; the greater the hostility level, the more casualties 
expected as a result.  This data is obtained from the variable “Total Civilian Casualties on both Sides 
(Killed/Wounded).”  This measure is a comprehensive indicator of military aggression, as the 
presence of civilian casualties represents a hostile invader, targeting not only military bases and 
officials but average citizens as well.  The measure “Amount of Troop Incursion” is also employed 
as an indicator of military aggression.  This data, available from the IMI database, is organized 
categorically in the following manner: 
 
0 = None 
1 = 1 – 1000 
2 = 1001 – 5000 
3 = 5001 – 10,000 
4 = 10,000+ 
 
The explanation behind the use of this variable as a measure of military aggression is that a larger, 
more aggressive conflict should necessarily involve a higher troop presence.  The higher the number 
of troops sent into battle, the more violence is expected as a result.   
 
Measuring Independent Variables - Gender Equality 
 
 The independent variable will be defined as “gender equality,” which I plan to measure in 
two different ways.  One important measure of gender equality is fertility rate, frequently utilized in 
past studies of this topic (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2003).  In those states where women’s societal role 
is defined by their motherhood, it follows that they have less opportunity to enter the labor force, 
become politically active, or gain social independence.  Therefore, fertility rate has the capability to 
measure women’s social equality and opportunity beyond motherhood, capturing the “interrelation 
among social, economic, and political access” (Caprioli 2002).  Fertility has consistently been shown 
to correlate with women’s status, insofar as higher fertility rates go hand-in-hand with poorer health, 
lower education and employment rates, and lower levels of decision making (Caprioli 2002).   
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Fertility rate data is obtained from the World Bank and will be organized into four 
categories, 1-4, ordered in groups of low to high fertility rates.    
 
 1 = 1.1 – 1.5 average fertility rate 
 2 = 1.501 – 2.1 average fertility rate 
 3 = 2.101 – 4.7 average fertility rate 
 4 = 4.701 – 7.5 average fertility rate 
 
After collecting fertility rate data from the World Bank and identifying rates closest in time to a 
nation’s military conflicts given the available data, this measure was divided into four groups to best 
represent the data categorically.  The groups were divided based on the best possible approximation 
to a normal distribution of data; therefore, the majority (~66%) of cases fall in categories 2 and 3, 
while about 34% of the cases are approximately divided between categories 1 and 4.  Because most 
countries fall near the median range of fertility rates, with fewer nations having an extremely low or 
extremely high rate, these categories attempted to mirror that relationship with a near-normal 
distribution and subsequent categorical division.  Because there is little variation in fertility rate per 
country over the span of this study, it is important to consider another, more flexible measure of 
gender equality.  Percentage of women in parliament will therefore contribute to the robustness of 
this variable, ensuring that each state’s gender equality is measured in two distinct manners. 
Women with high-level decision-making powers will have greater political influence.  While 
fertility rate provides an extensive measure of women’s social and economic equality and can be 
attributed to female political equality as well, the added measure of percentage of women in 
parliament contributes to the strength of our gender equality variable by including a more robust 
measure of female political equality.  This variable will be measured by percentage of women in 
parliament – data easily obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union statistical database.  This study 
will measure “percentage of women in parliament” by considering only the percentage of women in 
the Lower or single House, as many nations do not have an Upper or second legislative body.  The 
earliest data available for many of the countries in this data set is often between the years 1992-1994, 
so in cases where countries entered into conflicts previous to the data availability (for example, in 
1989) the earliest percentage available is applied to those conflicts as well.  Parallel to the 
categorization of fertility rate data, after approximating a normal distribution of data, parliament 
percentages were divided into categories 1-4, from highest to lowest representation.  As such, a 
category 1 for both measures represents the highest level of gender equality.  This study establishes 
the categories as follows: 
 
1 = 18.101 – 48.8% female representation in the lower house of Parliament 
2 = 10.901 – 18.1% female representation in the lower house of Parliament 
3 = 5.601– 10.9% female representation in the lower house of Parliament 
4 = 0 – 5.6% female representation in the lower house of Parliament 
 
Again, the categorical representation of this data proves useful when comparing the means of female 
representation in parliament to the five dummy variables for type of intervention. 
 
Data Analysis  
 
 This study uses several methods to analyze the data at hand.  First, to understand the 
relationship between types of military conflict (e.g., humanitarian vs. territorial disputes) and gender 
equality, the means of each equality measure (fertility rate and percentage of women in parliament) 
are compared against the dummy variables for each type of conflict.  By this measure of analysis, the 
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data seems to support the hypothesis that greater gender equality leads to lesser military aggression.  
This study designates humanitarian and social protective conflicts as examples of “less aggressive 
conflict” because they involve an intervention based on the goal of peace and assistance.  On the 
other hand, pursuit, strategic, and territorial interventions are designated as “more aggressive 
conflict” because the intent is based on the opposition of enemy forces or the quest for personal 
gain.  Because this study argues that gender-equal nations are less aggressive militarily, it follows that 
the interventions gender-equal nations do become involved in will be less aggressive or hostile as 
well.  In nations where governments extend equal rights and opportunities to women, including 
powers of decision making that allow women’s “pacifist” voices to be heard, military interventions 
are expected to be kept to a minimum and to be of a different nature than those of gender-unequal 
societies.   
Secondly, this study uses descriptive statistics to analyze the relationship between gender 
equality and the number of both troops involved and casualties incurred in military conflicts, as a 
more objective measure of military aggression.  I expect that greater gender equality leads to less 
aggressive military disputes, resulting in a less hostile interaction that involves both fewer troops and 
fewer casualties.  In the next section, I will examine the results of the subjective hostility (type of 
intervention) comparing means tests, before ultimately analyzing cross tabular results for the 
objective measures of military aggression.   
 
Comparing Gender Equality to Type of Intervention 
  
As described previously, the means of each gender measure are compared to the dummy 
variable (0 for no, 1 for yes) for each type of military intervention.  For each type of military 
intervention considered, the expectation is that fertility rate should be higher in more aggressive 
conflicts and lower in less aggressive conflicts seems to hold true, while parliamentary representation 
should be higher in less aggressive conflicts and lower in more aggressive conflicts.  With the 
possible exception of social protective interventions, the data is consistent with these expectations.  
The IMI database defines the goal of a social-protective intervention as “[the intent] to protect a 
socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.”  I initially selected this type of intervention 
as an example of a “less aggressive” conflict because the motives seem to fulfill the kind of maternal, 
caring actions expected from a more gender-equal (and therefore, pacifist) nation that reflects the 
attitudes of women as well as men.   
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It can be said that the pattern is consistent with what is expected for a less aggressive conflict 
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that were not (2.972).  Similarly, percentage of females in parliament is higher (12.558) for social-
protective interventions than for interventions that were not (12.374).  However, the difference 
between protective interventions and non-protective interventions across gender equality measures 
is negligible.  It may be the case that social-protective interventions are not an ideal model for “less 
aggressive” conflicts.  Social-protective interventions may not involve overtly aggressive or power-
hungry goals, but it may be that they do involve more violence than I expected, due to reactive 
aggression from the majority faction in the target country.  As such, the violence involved in this 
type of intervention may overshadow any maternalistic or pacifist motives on behalf of the 
intervening nations, making this type of intervention a poor indicator of a “less aggressive” conflict.  
Still, the remaining types of intervention seem consistent with the hypothesis, as the following data 
will demonstrate.    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humanitarian interventions, now the primary example of less aggressive conflicts, appear 
consistent with the hypothesis’ expectation about gender-equal nations.  The IMI database defines 
humanitarian intervention’s goals as “to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent 
starvation and so forth.”  The mean fertility rate for humanitarian interventions is 2.037, while the 
mean fertility rate for non-humanitarian interventions is 3.337, a substantial increase.  Similarly, the 
mean parliament percentage for humanitarian interventions is 14.731%, while the mean percentage 
for non-humanitarian interventions is 11.178%.  As expected, it seems as though those nations that 
become involved in humanitarian interventions have higher levels of gender equality than those that 
become involved in non-humanitarian conflicts.  Therefore, it may not only be true that gender-
equal states engage less frequently in military disputes, but also that the disputes they do become 
involved in are more pacifist in nature.   
 
 
  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examples of more aggressive conflicts appear consistent with the hypothesis as well.  The 
first example, pursuit, is defined by the IMI database as conflict that “Pursue[s] Rebel or Terrorist 
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Forces across Border or into Sanctuary.”  I reason that this connotes a more aggressive form of 
conflict, as it involves an aggressive pursuit of the enemy beyond a nation’s own boundaries.  The 
mean fertility rate for pursuit interventions is 4.29, while the mean fertility rate for non-pursuit 
interventions is 2.648.  The mean parliament percentage for pursuit interventions is 11.553%, while 
the mean parliament percentage for non-pursuit interventions is 12.524%.  As  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expected, it appears that the nations involved in pursuit interventions, a more aggressive form of 
conflict, have lower gender equality than those nations involved in non-pursuit interventions.  
Another form of more aggressive intervention, strategic, follows this pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic interventions are defined by the IMI database as “regional power balances, stability, or 
ideological issues mentioned by the intervener or clearly connected to the intervention.”  This form 
of conflict is designated as “more aggressive” because it involves a conflict initiated for personal 
gain, whether intended to grow a nation’s power in their region or to uphold the nation’s own belief 
system.  Though the fertility rate chart is somewhat misleading in that the difference between 
conflict types is rather small, the data still follows the expected relationship: mean fertility rate is 
higher (3.032) for strategic interventions and lower (2.862) for non-strategic interventions.  Women 
in parliament seems to be a more significant indicator of the difference between intervention types, 
as the mean parliamentary percentage for strategic interventions is 10.949% as opposed to 13.392% 
for non-strategic interventions.  Once again, it appears that nations involved in strategic 
interventions (a more aggressive type) are less gender-equal 
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The final type of “more aggressive” military conflict is territorial, defined by the IMI 
database as the “acquisition or retention of territory, delineation of frontiers, or specification of 
sovereign status.”  This type is defined as more aggressive because it involves one nation 
aggressively seeking to benefit itself with acquired territory or the establishment of sovereignty.  The 
mean fertility rate for territorial interventions is 3.147, while the mean fertility rate for non-territorial 
interventions is 2.797 – again, a smaller difference.  Parliamentary percentages provide a more 
substantial difference though, as the mean percentage for territorial interventions is 8.453%, while 
the mean percentage for non-territorial interventions is 13.283%.  Again it appears that the data 
supports the hypothesis, as those nations involved in territorial (aggressive) conflicts tend to be less 
gender-equal, with higher fertility rates and a lower percentage of female representation in 
parliament. 
 With the exception of social-protective interventions, which appear to be inconclusive in 
terms of strengthening the hypothesis (though they still follow the expected pattern, even if only by 
a hair), the relationship between conflict types and gender equality seems to support the idea that 
gender-equal nations will more likely intervene in less aggressive conflicts than in more aggressive 
conflicts, with the opposite being true for gender-unequal nations.  In the next section, the strength 
of the hypothesis will be further examined, as I test the relationship between gender equality 
measures and troop/casualty levels.  
 
Descriptive Statistics – Comparing Gender Equality to Troops/Casualties Incurred 
  
To analyze the relationship between gender equality and troops/casualties involved in 
military disputes, the established fertility rate and female parliamentary representation categories are 
utilized.  As described previously, these categories were developed to estimate a normal curve 
representation; the majority (roughly 66%) of cases fall in the second and third categories, with the 
minority (roughly 34%) falling in the extremities, categories 1 and 4.  Descriptive statistical crosstabs 
were run for each gender equality measure against each objective hostility/aggression measure 
(number of troops, and number of casualties to civilians), equaling four total crosstabs, provided in 
this study’s appendix.   
The first crosstab displays the relationship between female parliamentary percentages (by 
category) and number of civilian casualties on both sides (invader and target countries).  The 
statistical significance of this relationship is 0.258.  In other words, there is a 25.8% chance that this 
relationship occurred by chance, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  The data fails to clearly 
establish that female representation in parliament directly affects the number of civilian casualties in 
military disputes.  However, the other three crosstabs provide much more beneficial results. 
The second test was run on the relationship between fertility rate and number of casualties 
incurred in military disputes.  The significance test reveals a value that passes the 0.01 significance 
test, and therefore the null hypothesis that this relationship could have occurred by chance is 
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rejected.  Therefore, the data appears consistent with the hypothesis, in that fertility rate is positively 
correlated with number of casualties in conflict; the higher a nation’s fertility rate, the more 
casualties are likely to be incurred in that nation’s military disputes.  This finding is consistent with 
the theory that gender inequalities breed greater hostility and tendency toward violence; these 
unequal nations extend their domestic norms into the international arena and therefore have a 
greater propensity to violence, resulting in higher numbers of casualties during military disputes. 
Two similar tests were run with another measure of military aggression, number of troops.  
The first, relating female parliamentary representation to number of troops resulted in a significance 
of 0.05 and the null hypothesis is rejected.  This data appears consistent with the hypothesis.  The 
parliamentary percentages are inversely correlated to number of troops; the higher the percentage of 
women in parliament, the fewer troops involved in the corresponding military dispute(s).  Higher 
troop levels indicate a more aggressive invading country, one in which the so-called pacifist 
viewpoints of women are not included because they are ill-represented in parliament.  This data 
substantiates this theory, having established a significant relationship between these measures of 
gender equality and military aggression. 
The final test examines the relationship between fertility rate and number of troops.  This 
crosstab also reveals a significant relationship, with a significance value of 0.012 that allows the null 
hypothesis to be rejected as well.  As expected, fertility rate and number of troops are positively 
correlated; the higher a nation’s fertility rate, the higher the number of troops is likely to be.  High 
fertility rates reflect a gender-unequal society, in which dominant-aggressive and subordinating 
behaviors are the norm.  It follows that these traits should then be reflected in international 
interactions, which is why the results show that higher troop numbers (an indicator of high 
aggressiveness) correspond with high fertility rates.   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 This study examined the argument that gender inequalities lead to higher levels of military 
aggression.  Past literature has established a variety of frameworks for understanding this theory; the 
essentialist vs. constructivist debate attempts to pinpoint nature vs. nurture, respectively, as the 
cause for women’s apparent propensity towards peace.  These scholars argue that when women are 
treated as equals in society, their pacifist values will be reflected in interstate behaviors.  Another sect 
of this research takes a “consequentialist” view, claiming that the victimization of women in times of 
war leads them to reject violence in the name of self-interest.  Finally, another brand of scholars 
argues that behavioral structures are responsible for this relationship; those societies that structurally 
impose inequality and subordination at the domestic level will seek similar dominant behaviors 
internationally.   
This study attempted to add to this growing body of research in several ways.  First, due to 
limitations of the MID (Military Interstate Dispute) dataset, the most recent study on this topic 
(Caprioli 2003) leaves off in 1992.  Using the IMI database, this study has been able to include all 
cross-national conflicts between the years 1989 and 2005.  Secondly, past research has measured the 
dependent variable, military aggression, in a variety of ways: first use of force (Caprioli 2003), 
conflict duration (Caprioli 2000), or number of fatalities (Regan & Paskeviciute 2003).  To my 
knowledge, none of the previous studies on this topic have used any measure that goes beyond the 
question of a country’s likelihood of initiating conflict to further consider the type of conflict that is 
pursued.  This study attempted to strengthen the evidence for a causal relationship between gender 
inequality and military aggression, using the “Type of Intervention” measure.  The data is consistent 
with the expectation that conflicts initiated by more gender-equal states tend to be of a less 
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aggressive nature.  This measure permits a deeper understanding of aggressive military behaviors 
with respect to the types of actions pursued by gender-equal vs. gender-unequal states.   
Analysis of the data results shows a definite consistency with the hypothesis.  When 
considering types of intervention, every category displayed a substantial difference between gender-
equal and gender-unequal states, save for “social protection,” which displayed a negligible difference.  
In “peaceful” interventions (humanitarian), both fertility rates and parliamentary percentages 
reflected interveners that were much more gender-equal than those initiating non-humanitarian 
conflicts.  The opposite held true for “aggressive” interventions (pursuit, strategic, and territorial), 
with interveners more likely to be gender-unequal, and with higher fertility rates and lower 
percentages of women in parliament.   
In the analysis of this study’s objective measures of military aggression, number of civilian 
casualties and number of troops incurred, the data displayed further consistency with the hypothesis.  
With the exception of the relationship between parliamentary percentages and number of casualties, 
each tested relationship showed a high level of significance (<0.05).  The data supports the idea that 
greater gender equality leads to lesser military aggression.  It should be noted that both tests using 
fertility rate as the measure for gender equality had more highly significant results (0.000 for 
casualties, 0.012 for troops) than those that used parliamentary percentages (0.258 for casualties, 
0.050 for troops), so it can be inferred that the relationships using fertility rate as the measure for 
gender equality are less likely to have occurred by chance than those using percentages of women in 
parliament. 
 
Areas for Additional Research 
  
This study has corroborated the argument that domestic gender equality reduces the 
aggressiveness of military conflict, and results in a greater propensity towards peaceful rather than 
violent interventions.  Because structural domination of women is far from being the only type of 
inequality fostered by governments internationally, it would be interesting to examine the 
relationship between domestic racial equality and international state behavior as well.  I would expect 
to find a similar pattern to the findings of this study, though accurate indicators of racial equality 
may not be so easy to come by; there may not be a racial equivalent of “fertility rate” as a measure 
that encompasses all realms of equality.   
The measure of female representation in parliament was used to approximate gender 
equality, and this study maintains that it is a valid measure in understanding the level of equality a 
woman experiences in society.  Higher percentages of women in parliament seem to go hand-in-
hand with lower fertility rates across the data collected here.  Still, it is difficult to assert that the sole 
position of any number of women in a legislative body gives them substantial influence on policy.  
Certainly, common sense leads us to believe that a higher percentage of women in parliament leads 
to greater influence by virtue of a louder voice, but in nations where “equality” is a standard 
enforced by quota and not by feminist ideals, how can we know for sure that those female legislators 
have a say in policy that is proportional to their numerical representation?  The extent to which 
women in parliament directly influence the direction of policy may be difficult to measure, though 
tallies of votes in support or opposition to major policy decisions along with the subsequent vote 
result might be available in developed countries at least.  Additional research that measures women’s 
influence on the policy process would be extremely beneficial in truly understanding international 
gender equality.   
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Appendix 
 
X = Parliamentary Percentages 
Y = <umber of Casualties 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 79.378a 72 .258 
Likelihood Ratio 77.522 72 .307 
Linear-by-Linear Association .459 1 .498 
N of Valid Cases 171   
a. 96 cells (96.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
is .15. 
 
X = Fertility Rate 
Y = <umber of Casualties 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.552E2 81 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 137.905 81 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.662 1 .010 
N of Valid Cases 193   
a. 108 cells (96.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .12. 
 
X = Parliamentary Percentages 
Y = <umber of Troops 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.057a 12 .050 
Likelihood Ratio 22.755 12 .030 
Linear-by-Linear Association .652 1 .419 
N of Valid Cases 263   
 
X = Fertility Rate 
Y = <umber of Troops 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.670a 12 .012 
Likelihood Ratio 26.867 12 .008 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.320 1 .251 
N of Valid Cases 288   
a. 5 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.09. 
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